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‘No, niente appello!’: How De Gasperi sent Guareschi to prison 
[The Italianist, n. 25, 2005, ii: 239-259] 
Alan R. Perry 
 
Non capisco perché debbano fare la perizia, giacché mio marito ha affermato di non 
aver mai scritto quei documenti. (Francesca De Gasperi) 
 
De Gasperi lo querelò. Ne scaturì un processo in cui, però, nonostante le formali 
assicurazioni, non fu ammessa la perizia grafica sulle lettere in possesso di Guareschi. 
Esse vennero considerate false sulla base della parola di De Gasperi. (Antonio Di 
Pietro) 
 
Per rimanere liberi, bisogna a un bel momento prendere, senza esitare, la via della 
prigione. (Giovannino Guareschi) 
 
No one could have suspected the political bombshell Candido editor Giovannino 
Guareschi dropped on the Italian political scene in early 1954. As it occurred, it almost 
seemed like something that belonged to the Mondo Piccolo, the imaginary world 
Guareschi created that had brought him untold commercial and popular success. Indeed, 
in the realm of Don Camillo and Peppone, inflammatory accusations were daily 
occurrences. But this claim seemed to go beyond what anyone had reasonably come to 
expect from Guareschi’s caustic pen that lampooned the real world of Italian Cold War 
society and politics. In 1948 Guareschi had stood fast with then Prime Minister Alcide 
De Gasperi to defeat the Popular Front. Six years later, any semblance of continuity 
between the inveterate allied enemies of Communism came to an abrupt end. 
 Guareschi accused De Gasperi of having asked the Allies during World War II to 
bomb the periphery of Rome in order to incite a popular insurrection against the 
Germans. He backed his claim with a photocopied letter that carried De Gasperi’s 
signature. Soon thereafter, he published another missive, this time entirely written in De 
Gasperi’s hand. The former Prime Minister brought a criminal suit against Guareschi for 
his inflammatory commentary that accompanied the letters. The April trial lasted four 
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days and captivated the nation. In the end, a Milan tribunal found Guareschi guilty of 
libel. Incensed by what he experienced as a lack of justice, Guareschi refused to appeal. 
He spent the next fourteen months in a Parma prison.  
Unfortunately, misconceptions about the case began to form immediately after the 
verdict, and over time they have become crystallized as part of the official record. 
Numerous historians, literary critics, and journalists believe the court condemned 
Guareschi not for libel but for having published false documents, a judgment that, in 
reality, the court never decided. For example, the Storia della Democrazia Cristiana 
(1988), documents the case in this manner:  
Si trattava, in realtà, di un falso che faceva parte di un gruppo di lettere apocrife, che 
comprendeva anche un carteggio tra Churchill e Mussolini, da tempo offerte in vendita ad 
imprese editoriali e perfino al governo dietro richiesta di compensi vari (tra i quali 
amnistie, licenze d'importazione ecc.). De Gasperi sporse querela contro il direttore del 
Candido. Il processo, che si svolse a Milano dal 13 al 15 aprile 1954, riuscì a provare la 
falsità  del documento pubblicato e costò a Guareschi la condanna ad un anno di carcere.1   
 
Other misunderstandings exist as to how the court came to its decision and what 
motivated Guareschi not to seek an appeal.  
 It is time to set the historical record straight. A close examination of the official 
proceedings of De Gasperi v. Guareschi will show how enough misplaced discredit has 
been strewn upon Guareschi’s memory to warrant a revision of facts. A study of the 
case’s intricacies will also shed light upon the sway that De Gasperi’s moral stature had 
upon the Italian judiciary in the early 1950s. As such, to begin our inquiry and 
comprehend the proceedings in full, we must first appreciate both Guareschi’s evolving 
relationship with De Gasperi and the history behind the two documents Guareschi used to 
disparage his adversary. In the process, we will better appreciate why by January 1954 
Guareschi considered the former prime minister as Italy’s greatest enemy.2  
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I. Disenchantment with De Gasperi and coming to possess letters in Mussolini’s 
dossier 
 
When Guareschi founded Candido in 1946, still adjusting from his World War II 
experience of twenty-one months as a German prisoner of war, he staunchly supported 
the retention of the monarchy. Although he felt bitter when the referendum sent King 
Umberto II and his family into exile, he resolved to pour his energies into defeating the 
Popular Front. Guareschi loathed Communism, fearing that its political philosophy 
robbed people of their capacity to think freely for themselves. He also harbored 
misgivings about the power of the Christian Democrat Party (DC), but he found a staunch 
ally in the anti-Communist Alcide De Gasperi. For Guareschi, De Gasperi had been the 
principal statesman who had forged the Republic in the precarious times of the 
dopoguerra [Reconstruction], and for this achievement he had earned Guareschi’s 
respect. He referred to De Gasperi as ‘l’uomo politico più intelligente d’Europa, dopo 
Churchill’.3   
Together with De Gasperi, Guareschi played an important role in defeating the 
Popular Front (the Socialist-Communist coalition) in 1948. His anti-Communist satire in 
Candido gripped reader attention, and two influential political posters that he designed 
were plastered on walls and kiosks throughout the Italian peninsula.4 Life magazine 
reported that two men, De Gasperi and Guareschi, had primarily won the Italian 
elections.5 In time, however, the growing might of the DC began to worry Guareschi, 
who saw its power as potentially capable of unduly commanding the will of the Italian 
people. He firmly disliked how the DC took advantage of its favored status with the 
Church, and he often exhorted the party not to foment confusion among the electorate 
concerning the distinction between the two.6  
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Over the course of 1952 Guareschi grew despondent with the DC and its 
leadership, believing that the promised political reforms they championed never 
materialized.7 More and more, Guareschi distanced himself from the DC and gave public 
support to the Monarch Party. The definitive break with De Gasperi — at the time no 
longer the Prime Minister — occurred with the fall of the Pella government. As the pages 
of Candido reveal, Guareschi believed that De Gasperi had instigated a sneaky, 
underhanded vote of no confidence for Pella since he had moved too far to the Right. In 
this vein, De Gasperi purportedly toppled a leader of his own party because he wanted 
Mario Scelba to preside as Prime Minister, a biased move that would better enhance his 
own chances at becoming President of the Republic.  
Infuriated at this supposedly unscrupulous maneuver, Guareschi saw De Gasperi 
as a stealthy political sharpshooter who knocks off adversaries with ruthless 
determination and accurate aim. Thus, in the 24 January 1954 edition of Candido, 
Guareschi entitled an invective against De Gasperi ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino’, recalling to 
mind the popular song from World War I about the lethality of sharpshooters. The article 
proved to be the most provocative of Guareschi’s career, an essay of tremendous 
consequences.  In it, Guareschi claimed that De Gasperi had been duplicitous to the point 
of treachery. 
To prove his point, he reproduced a letter De Gasperi had presumably written 
during World War II from the Vatican, where he had gained asylum. The missive, written 
on Vatican letterhead and dated 19 January 1944, was addressed to the English 
Lieutenant Colonel Bonham Carter and read:  
Egregio signor Colonnello, non avendo ricevuto alcun riscontro in merito alla mia 
ultima del 12 gennaio ’44, mi permetto di trascriverle interamente il contenuto della 
precedente, rimasta fino ad oggi senza esito.  
 5 
Tramite un corriere P.O. affidiamo la presente contenene la nostra più ampia 
assicurazione che quanto S.E. il Generale ALEXANDER  desidera venga effettuato, 
come azione collaterale da parte dei nostri gruppi Patrioti, sarà scrupolosamente attuato.  
Ci è purtuttavia doloroso, ma necessario, insistere nuovamente affinché la 
popolazione romana si decida ad insorgere al nostro fianco, che non devono essere 
risparmiate azioni di bombardamento nella zona periferica della città nonché sugli 
obbiettivi militari segnalati. 
Questa azione, che a cuore stretto invochiamo, è la sola che potrà infrangere 
l’ultima resistenza morale del popolo romano, se particolarmente verrà preso, quale 
obbiettivo, l’acquedotto, punto nevralgico vitale. 
Ci urge inoltre, e nel più breve tempo possibile il già sollecitato rifornimento, 
essendo giunti allo stremo.  
La preghiamo pertanto, nel più breve tempo possibile di assicurarci di tutto, e di 
credere nella nostra immutabile fede nella lotta contro il comune nemico nazi-fascista. 
    Degasperi8 
 
Guareschi also referenced how a handwriting expert had deemed the letter was genuine, a 
declaration subsequently validated by a notaio [public notary]. He knew the seriousness 
of the charge and clearly wanted his readers to know what authentication process had led 
him to publish the letters.   
What really stung Guareschi was not that De Gasperi had requested that the Allies 
bomb Rome, but that he had passed himself off as an official representative of the 
Vatican by using the letterhead in order to give weight to his request. As Guareschi 
commented: ‘Non è un gesto incosciente e stolto: è un vero e proprio sacrilegio. Non è un 
semplice gesto di uno che tradisce l’ospitalità, è il gesto nefando di un cattolico che 
tradisce il Santo Padre’.9 Thus, for Guareschi, the letter proved that De Gasperi would 
seek to achieve his political ends by any means necessary. If he could take advantage of 
one supranational entity, what could he do to his own political party or to the nation 
itself? Guareschi exploded: ‘Freddo, spietato, privo di ogni scrupolo, feroce, se occorre, 
De Gasperi è in questo particolare momento l’uomo più pericoloso che l’Italia si possa 
trovare alle costole’.10 
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 The allegations could not have come at a more inopportune time. The political 
climate in the early 1950s, shaped so powerfully by the dominant Christian Democrats 
and the Church, allowed little room for caustic opposition. In many respects, the DC 
leadership felt threatened by a possible loss of power and efficacy.11 A few months prior 
to Guareschi’s accusations, the government had cracked down hard on film critics Renzo 
Renzi and Guido Aristarco, arresting them for ‘vilipendio delle Forze Armate’ because 
they had published in Cinema Nuovo a condemnation of the Italian campaign in Greece.12 
The DC leadership was simply hypersensitive to criticism.13  
 Of course, in excoriating De Gasperi for an alleged political ploy, Guareschi 
seemed reckless and foolhardy, naive at best, for in the collective imagination of the early 
1950s, De Gasperi was anything but a villain. Generally considered as the father of the 
Italian Republic, he had no plausible rival. He had uncannily managed successive 
coalitions, negotiated a favorable peace treaty, and kept the Communists out of 
government. Guareschi went after a public icon at a time when his character was above 
reproach.  
From Rome, De Gasperi reacted swiftly, issuing a press release denying the 
accusation, explaining that he had previously seen a counterfeited letter on Vatican 
letterhead with his signature. Obviously, he claimed, it had come back into public 
circulation.14 The following day he repeated his denial, explaining that he had earlier 
rejected attempts by blackmailers who had approached him with purportedly 
compromising documents; now these usurers had found a gullible buyer in Guareschi. 15  
The counter-campaign started, and the Catholic press began to rail against Guareschi. Il 
Popolo for example called him ‘disonesto, cinicamente bugiardo, ciecamente 
disumano’.16   
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For his part, Guareschi had not finished his assault. A week later, accompanied by 
the same attestations of authenticity, he published another note, this time entirely 
handwritten and not under a letterhead. It seemed as though the first letter had never 
reached its destination, for it read:  
Carissimo,  
Spero di ottenere da Salerno il colpo di grazia. Avrete presto gli aiuti chiesti. 
Coraggio, avanti e sempre, per la Santa Battaglia, auguri buon lavoro e fede. 
26 Gen. ’44      
Degasperi17  
Guareschi also for the first time gave a hint that he was aware how grave the charges 
were, indicating that he had to follow his conscience in sustaining his claims in the face 
of a justice system about to bring its full weight down upon him. He stated: ‘Io bado 
molto alla mia coscienza; preferirei essere condannato dalla Giustizia ed essere assolto 
dalla mia coscienza piuttosto che essere assolto dalla Giustizia ed essere condannato dalla 
mia coscienza. Io so che in questa vicenda il vero imputato non sono io, è De Gasperi. E 
la parte lesa è la Nazione’.18 
 The accusations and rebuttals between the two highly visible public figures 
became a public sensation, especially after De Gasperi formally brought suit against 
Guareschi for libel on 6 February 1954. The occasion actually marked the second time in 
Guareschi’s life that he faced such charges. Three years earlier an appellate court had 
given him a suspended sentence of eight months for a series of vignettes that lampooned 
President Luigi Einaudi.19 In the present case, if the court found him guilty, he was sure to 
receive in full the reinstated penalty of the earlier ruling. Guareschi, however, pressed 
ahead, supremely sure of himself. 
 His confidence stemmed from an encounter he had with Enrico De Toma, a 
former Republic of Salò officer and Mussolini aide-de-camp. De Toma had convinced 
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Guareschi that at the end of World War II the Duce had given him a dossier to secure in 
Switzerland; it contained documents that the Duce wanted published five years from that 
time should he happened to be killed. Thus, after several failed attempts to sell the 
documents in the dossier to either the media or government officials, De Toma sought out 
Guareschi and the forum of Candido.20 Once in possession of the letters, Guareschi went 
to a handwriting expert, Umberto Focaccia, who vouched their authenticity. When a 
public notary, Bruno Stamm, certified Focaccia’s competence, Guareschi felt most 
optimistic that the letters were genuine and part of a more complete series of letters and 
memoranda that belonged to a dossier Mussolini had supposedly spirited to Switzerland 
during the waning days of the Republic of Salò. 
 The mystery surrounding the existence of documents Mussolini kept, many of 
which detail his allegedly secret relationship with Winston Churchill, has piqued 
scholarly and popular interest since the end of the war and sparked lively debate. Emilio 
Re in Storia di un archivio provided one of the first historical studies of the various 
dossiers found among Mussolini’s private and official archives after the war but does not 
spend great length surmising if Churchill and Mussolini maintained a secret 
correspondence. Other works that treat the story of the purported dossier include Peter 
Tompkin’s Dalle carte segrete del Duce, Renzo De Felice’s Rosso e nero, Arrigo 
Petacco’s Dear Benito, caro Winston, and two works by Fabio Andriola, Mussolini-
Churchill: Carteggio segreto and Appuntamento sul lago. Tompkins holds that the 
dossier did exist, that Churchill had specifically sought to recover it, and that it was 
eventually returned to the British government in the 1950s. De Felice believes that many 
documents found in Switzerland written by Mussolini are authentic, but that the letters 
Guareschi published were most likely false. Andriola and Petacco hold a similar position, 
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stating that many of Mussolini’s documents are genuine but that among those presented 
by De Toma some are forgeries. 
Furthermore, as Petacco recounts, journalist Ferruccio Lanfranchi first published 
a long article for the Corriere della Sera on 31 March 1950 and later a second dated 17 
April 1951 that attempted to establish the dossier’s existence and itinerary. Guareschi 
explained in Candido that Lanfranchi’s second article had caught his eye, and that he had 
begun to follow stories concerning the alleged file over the span of three years.21 Once De 
Toma had given him the letters which were subsequently authenticated, he believed that 
he was legally obliged to consider the notes bona fide because of the avowal provided by 
the perito calligrafico [the handwriting expert].22 
The court case was set to begin on 13 April 1954 under the auspices of a Milanese 
tribunal. Guareschi had two capable defenders, Vincenzo Porzio and Michele Learner, 
and he assumed that the court would appoint calligraphy experts able to determine that 
the missives were legitimate. For his part, De Gasperi made a shrewd tactical move in 
appointing Giacomo Delitala as legal counsel and head of the prosecutorial team: Delitala 
had intimate knowledge of his adversary since he himself had defended Guareschi in the 
Einaudi case three years earlier.  The actual proceedings provided many surprises.  
 
 
II. The Case and Guareschi’s Attempts at Defense: 
 
De Gasperi had charged Guareschi on two counts: first with libel and second for 
knowingly having published false documents. Initially presenting Guareschi’s defense, 
Lerner petitioned the court to consider determining the latter charge first rather than 
proceed with the former.23 In theory, he surmised, if Guareschi could prove that the letters 
were indeed authentic by way of chemical and handwriting analysis, this would render 
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the first charge untenable. If Guareschi’s damning words about De Gasperi’s character 
were based on genuine and not counterfeit documents, it would have been impossible for 
him to have libeled De Gasperi because he would effectively have been speaking the 
truth. Once Guareschi proved the letters were authentic, so Learner thought, the charge of 
libel could not possibly stick. 
 Delitala countered this motion, arguing that regardless of the authenticity of the 
documents, Guareschi’s stinging claims themselves had soiled De Gasperi’s reputation. 
The court thus had one question before it and not two: ‘in questa sede l’imputato 
Guareschi deve rispondere di un unico processo, e cioè di diffamazione a mezzo della 
stampa e non pure di reato di falso’.24  The Pubblico Ministro also agreed that the case 
before the court concerned libel and not malice.25 The tribunal overruled Lerner’s petition 
to determine the veracity of the letters first before proceeding with the charge of libel. 
The trial thus would specifically try Guareschi for libel and not render judgment on 
whether or not the letters were authentic.  
 The direction the case took, as determined by the court with this decision, is 
important for two primary reasons. First, in popular lore the case has always been seen as 
having decisively determined that the letters were false. But, as the proceedings clearly 
detail, the trial determined libel based on the essays that accompanied the letters. In the 
end, the tribunal never officially determined the authenticity of the documents one way or 
another.26 Second, with its decision, the court squarely placed the burden to establish that 
the letters were authentic on Guareschi, who could only hope that the tribunal would later 
accept his petition to have the letters examined. He faced an uphill battle. De Gasperi, on 
the other hand, only had to convince the court that Guareschi’s words alone themselves 
were libelous.  
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 In its formal introductory procedures (the interrogatorio), the court allowed 
Guareschi to read a full explanation of his actions that detailed his long journalistic 
interaction with De Gasperi as politician. Guareschi emphasized emphatically that he 
aimed his diatribe at De Gasperi’s political position and not at his honor as an individual: 
‘Non pubblicai le lettere in questione per diffamare De Gasperi in quanto esse sono di per 
sé stesse la manifestazione di una normale azione di Guerra. [. . .] Io ho sempre criticato 
sul mio giornale il “politicante” e non già l’uomo, che non mi interessava’.27 Guareschi 
also explained how he came to possess the letters, communicating his awareness that the 
documents in Mussolini’s dossier could have been fabricated and stating firmly that he 
never would have published a part of such a file without the utmost certainty that the 
letters were authentic. 28  He then responded to various questions posed by the court that 
further detailed his understanding of how government agents had tried to acquire the 
dossier since the end of the war.29  
 Alcide De Gasperi responded with his official deposition, carefully insisting that 
he never could have written such letters since his seeking to have Rome bombed would 
have been so unfathomable:  
 Insisto ancora nell’affermare che le due lettere pubblicate sul “Candido” sono 
apocrife. 
 Io non ho mai tenuto alcuna corrispondenza con degli elementi anglo-americani. 
 È semplicemente assurdo che io allora, quale segretario della biblioteca del 
Vaticano avrei usato della carta intestata per chiedere un’azione di bombardamento su 
Roma, contrariamente ai quei principi a cui si informava tutta l’attività del Vaticano 
stesso.  
 Le lettere di cui è causa non le ho mai scritte e voglio precisare che sono di un 
contenuto completamente assurdo e ridicolo. 
 Non ho mai conosciuto il Col Bonham Carter, non solo, ma sconoscevo 
completamente l’indirizzo di Salerno della base aerea degli Alleati. […] 
 Ripeto una volta che il contenuto delle lettere è illogico ed assurdo, perché 
contrario al mio principio di uomo politico, non solo, ma non c’era alcun motivo che io 
richiedessi il bombardamento della periferia di Roma quando la medesima città veniva 
bombardata lo stesso, nonostante fosse stata dichiarata città aperta. [. . .] È ingenuo 
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pensare che un uomo che ha avuto l’onore di governare l’Italia per sei-sette anni possa 
avere la leggerezza di scrivere delle lettere del tenore come quelle di cui è causa.30  
 
Once he established a moral alibi via his historical accomplishments, De Gasperi evoked 
the sacred memory of the Resistance: ‘Se io avessi scritto le lettere in questione sarei 
venuto meno a quegli obblighi che mi vincolavano al Comitato di Liberazione nazionale, 
ed anche, come ho già detto, agli obblighi verso la S. Sede’.31  Thus, De Gasperi’s first 
testimony relied heavily on establishing the improbability of his supposed action while 
also summoning his role in a sacrosanct movement that had legitimated the Italian 
democratic experience after the war.32 
 Through an interpreter, the court next heard testimony from retired Colonel 
Arthur Desmond Bonham Carter who had flown in from England. He denied that he had 
ever been stationed at Salerno in the Peninsular Base Section; he affirmed that he had 
never heard of De Gasperi until after the war; and he swore that he had never received, at 
any time, any form of communication whatsoever from him. 33 
 After listening to Bonham Carter, an interpreter read a letter from Field Marshal 
Harold Alexander. He too stated he had never heard of De Gasperi until after the war and 
explained how a request to bomb Rome in and of itself would have been extremely 
unusual. Most requests he had received concerning the Eternal City aimed at the direct 
opposite:  ‘the alleged letter contains a request that Rome be bombed and suggests that 
this request had been made previously. My recollection is that all requests reaching our 
headquarters at that time on this subject were invariably to the effect that Rome should 
not be bombed, and such records as I have been able to consult confirm this’.34  
 The court then called Bruno Stamm, the public notary, to testify. Stamm, who had 
vouched for Focaccia’s expert opinion, affirmed that he had two letters in his possession 
in Locarno, Switzerland — specifically the originals of the ones Guareschi had published 
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and no letter dated 12 January 1944 — and that he was ready to have them sent to the 
Tribunal at a moment’s notice. With his statements, the first day’s proceedings ended.  
The following day, 14 April 1954, proved decisive for the prosecution. Under 
oath, De Gasperi recounted the facts relevant to how the government had made attempts 
to ascertain if certain alleged documents from Mussolini’s files, in circulation since the 
early 1950s, were authentic. He related that in 1953 investigators had traveled to 
Switzerland and studied documents that purportedly compromised the integrity of certain 
government officials. According to De Gasperi, an agent claimed that he had seen a series 
of numbers on a letter dated 12 January with the Vatican letterhead, but that when he 
checked with the Vatican’s official registry of correspondence, the numbers did not 
match.35  De Gasperi further stated that the search for such documents had not been 
undertaken as a result of an official mandate. 36  
 The tribunal then heard from Lerner who asked permission to interrogate six 
witnesses that could refute De Gasperi’s claims. Specifically, Lerner wanted the court to 
consider why several government agents had sought the documents and had even offered 
money to purchase the documents in the dossier. Lerner wanted to establish that De 
Gasperi feared that something in the dossier compromised him, thus establishing a reason 
to believe the letters were authentic.37  More importantly, Lerner petitioned the court to 
perform a chemical and handwriting examination of the two letters that had arrived from 
Locarno under Stamm’s care.38  
The proceedings had reached a crucial moment. Up until this point, De Gasperi 
had attacked Guareschi by casting doubt of his ever having written the letters. De Gasperi 
had not proven definitively, however, that he had not actually written them. With the 
opportunity for scientific analysis, Guareschi would now have the chance to demonstrate 
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how De Gasperi could plausibly have written the letters. But Delitala asked that all the 
requests made by Guareschi be denied since, as he sustained, nothing would truly be 
gained in granting them and the delay would further damage the moral character of his 
client.39 Lerner countered, continuing to insist that scientific examination be undertaken.   
Initially, the Pubblico Ministro agreed with the defendant.40At this 
pronouncement, however, Delitala masterfully manipulated the sensibilities of the court, 
expounding the implications that such an analysis would have for De Gasperi’s honor. 
Referring to the testimony provided by Bonham Carter, he mused aloud what more proof 
was necessary — ‘Che, si vuole di più dopo le prove decisive già fornite?’— and then 
implored: 
Mi rivolgo alla vostra coscienza e vi dico: se voi accettate la perizia calligrafica vuol dire 
che avete ancora dei dubbi. Vuol dire che pensate che De Gasperi può anche averle 
scritte. Vuol dire che non credete alla deposizione di Bonham Carter, alla lettera di 
Alexander, che credete possibile l’assurdità del modo, dei tempi, dei luoghi in cui quelle 
lettere avrebbero dovute essere scritte. E dopo non avere ritenute sufficienti le prove 
puntuali oggettive che noi vi abbiamo fornito, crederete a una perizia? E se il perito dirà: 
“Sembra, forse”? Capovolgerete il processo?41 
 
Upon hearing these words, Guareschi knew he had lost the case. In the next 
edition of Candido, he wrote:  
L’argomentazione del Professore è formidabile: ordinare una perizia significa mettere in 
dubbio il giuramento di De Gasperi. Significa esprimere pubblicamente il sospetto che 
De Gasperi possa giurare il falso! [. . .]  
 Ecco la chiave del processo. [. . . .] l’avevo già capito dove volesse andare a finire 
il Professore e già avevo dichiarato: “Stando così le cose si tratterà di un anno in 
galera.”42 
 
Delitala’s gambit wielded the fatal blow. At stake was which to believe -- the work of a 
trained expert or the oath of an honorable statesman backed up by the word of two British 
officers. The judges had to assume the responsibility of possibly finding that De Gasperi 
had perjured himself, the very man who had nobly led Italy out of the tumultuous 
dopoguerra and stood as a bulwark against the threat of communism.43  
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 After approximately an hour, the court reconvened and delivered its 
pronouncement, rejecting Guareschi’s request to present his witnesses and submit the 
letters to scientific analysis since they were deemed to be ‘del tutto inutili, essendo la 
causa sufficientemente istruita ai fini del decidere’.44  In effect, the Court ruled that it was 
not necessary to subject the letters to testing because De Gasperi, as a result of testimony 
and witnesses presented, had so overwhelmingly shown the implausibility of his ever 
having written the missives.  As such, although it did not do so officially or directly, the 
Court was saying that the letters were false without definite proof, effectively sacking any 
further options for Lerner to defend Guareschi. 
Lerner rose from his bench, publicly decried the ruling, removed his gown, and 
stormed from the courtroom.45 The following day, the judges read the guilty verdict, 
justifying their finding in the following way: 
 Dalle considerazioni di cui innanzi, anche senza tener conto dei dinieghi della 
parte lesa che, per aver prestato giuramento, per il nostro sistema processuale, va creduta, 
appare evidente che le lettere riportate sul “Candido” non possono essere che false. 
 La richiesta perizia grafica, con tutte le incertezze insite in tal genere di perizia, 
non avrebbe potuto apportare alcun lume anche perché, nella migliore delle ipotesi per 
l’imputato, una semplice affermazione del perito non avrebbe mai potuto fare diventare 
credibile e certo, ciò che obiettivamente è risultato impossibile e inverosimile. 
 La perizia perciò non avrebbe detto nulla per quanto riguarda la prova del fatto 
addebitato all’offeso e sarebbe soltanto servita a procrastinare una decisione che, con gli 
elementi acquisiti, poteva e doveva già essere precisa. 
 Forse la perizia avrebbe potuto rivestire una certa utilità per altri fini e altre 
persone ma ci troveremmo in un campo del tutto diverso da quello nel quale siamo tenuti 
ad agire ed il Tribunale non ha la pretesa di fare la Storia mentre ha il diritto di rendere 
giustizia a chi fiducioso gli si rivolge.46  
 
Thus, while the Tribunal declared that De Gasperi had not written the letters, it 
admitted at the same time that a scientific analysis might indeed reveal that he could 
have. Yet the only way to arrive at that conclusion depended upon the chemical and 
expert handwriting analysis that it had denied Guareschi. The last sentence appears both 
ironic and contradictory since justice might not in fact have been done.  
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 A careful study of the Tribunal’s reasoning reveals the considerations that swayed 
its opinion. We do well to read all seven in full as the Court listed them:  
1.  Essere mai pensabile che si invii una lettera che dovrà attraversare il fronte, firmando 
chiaramente tale lettera col proprio nome quando è notorio che nel periodo della 
Resistenza tutti si celavano, ai fini della sicurezza personale dietro nomi 
convenzionali? 
 
2. Si legge nel “Candido” che le lettere furono affidate “ad un corriere che fu poi 
catturato dalle forze fasciste fuori dalle sacre mura”; quindi lo stesso 19 gennaio 1944 
i fascisti vennero in possesso di tale documento. Può credersi che un documento di 
tale importanza, nel quale non si esitava a richiedere il bombardamento 
dell’acquedotto, con tutte le prevedibili conseguenze, non fosse dai fascisti portato 
subito, in mille modi, a conoscenza della popolazione romana per mettere, da una 
parte, in cattiva luce le forze della resistenza ed i suoi modi subdoli di lotta e tentare, 
dall’altra, di rialzare il loro traballante prestigio? 
 
3. Nella lettera 19 gennaio 1944 si fa esplicito riferimento ad altra lettera datata 12 
gennaio stesso anno, contenente le stesse richieste ed indirizzata alla stessa persona. 
De Gasperi, per ripetere tale richiesta, evidentemente turbato dal ritardo, (si tratta, si 
badi bene, di sette giorni soltanto e la lettera doveva essere recapitata oltre le linee) 
doveva avere molto a cuore quanto chiedeva ed allora, perché mai servirsi di un 
mezzo che si era dimostrato così insicuro quando nel Laterano era installata una radio 
trasmettente attraverso la quale più celermente e più sicuramente avrebbe potuto 
comunicare con le autorità alleate? 
 
4. Nella lettera veniva esplicitamente chiesta un’azione di guerra; poteva essa azione 
venire sostanzialmente chiesta da un privato cittadino? È notorio che le forze della 
resistenza avevano una giunta militare che certamente avrebbe avuto più competenza 
a rivolgere una richiesta del genere. 
 
5. Nella lettera inviata dal Generale Alexander è chiaramente detto che una richiesta del 
genere sarebbe stata presa in considerazione soltanto se fosse pervenuta agli Alleati 
tramite il Maresciallo Badoglio: se una convenzione esisteva è logico che i membri 
del C.L.N. ne fossero a conoscenza e quindi poteva mai pensare De Gasperi che la 
sua richiesta avesse sortito un esito?  
 
6. Il teste Bonham Carter, al quale era indirizzata la lettera, ha esplicitamente escluso di 
essere stato applicato alla Peninsular Base Section di Salerno e soprattutto di 
conoscere il De Gasperi firmatario della lettera del quale senti` parlare soltanto dopo 
la totale liberazione del territorio nazionale. Né può pensarsi ad un errore di indirizzo, 
in quanto dal tenore della lettera appare chiaro che tra i due era già in atto uno 
scambio di corrispondenza; quindi il Carter ed il De Gasperi, sia pure per 
corrispondenza, dovevano ben conoscersi, cosa invece smentita da entrambi. 
 
7. Inutilità di richiedere delle azioni di guerra che, purtroppo, venivano già regolarmente 
effettuate e che come dice il Gen. Alexander nella già ricordata lettera, erano 
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continuamente oggetto di lagnanze da parte della autorità italiane e Vaticane. Del 
resto risulta che lo acquedotto di Roma fin dal luglio 1943 aveva subito azioni di 
bombardamento.47   
 
Each point the court weighed surely influenced their opinion that the letters were false, 
especially the testimony of the British witnesses that it viewed as most reliable. But in the 
end, the points, taken separately or together as a whole, prove nothing.  
 As the venerable judge Giovanni Durando surmised in his 1994 memoir Io No!, 
just because it was not comprehensible that a person could send a letter with a signature 
bearing a name through the lines, we have no proof beyond a shadow of a doubt that De 
Gasperi did not write the letter. Just because it was unthinkable that the Fascists would 
not have immediately published the letters if they had captured them, we have no proof 
beyond a shadow of a doubt that De Gasperi did not write the letters. Just because De 
Gasperi had a radio transmitter at his disposal that he could have used to communicate 
with the Allies, we have no proof beyond a shadow of a doubt that De Gasperi did not 
write the letters—perhaps he chose to write the letters just the same. Just because it 
seemed highly unlikely that De Gasperi as a private citizen could have asked the Allies to 
bomb the aqueduct in Rome, we have no proof that he did not do so anyway. Just because 
the letters did not come from Badoglio and the Allies would not have considered them 
seriously, we cannot declare without doubt that De Gasperi did not write the letters. Just 
because Bonham Carter testified that he was not stationed at the Peninsular Base Section 
and did not know De Gasperi, we do not necessarily have proof that De Gasperi did not 
write them anyway — perhaps he had the wrong address or perhaps he mistook one 
Colonel Bonham Carter for another. Finally, just because, as Alexander testified in his 
letter, it would have been pointless to ask the Allies to bomb Rome since they were 
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attacking the city anyway, we have no proof that De Gasperi did not send a request just 
the same. 
 The Public Minister’s explanation of why the Court denied scientific analysis 
provides even more proof that it treated Guareschi unjustly: ‘Prima ancora che contro le 
prove, i due ignobili pezzi di carta si sono sgretolati contro il luminoso alibi morale 
dell’onorevole De Gasperi’.48 This assertion, too, is noteworthy, for in a very intriguing 
way it mirrors what De Gasperi’s wife Francesca had voiced prior to the beginning of the 
trial: ‘Io non capisco perché debbano fare la perizia, quando mio marito ha affermato di 
non aver mai scritto quei documenti’.49  In light of De Gasperi’s moral alibi, why did the 
tribunal not consider Guareschi’s moral alibi as well? 
 The actual punishment the court meted out obliged Guareschi to spend one year in 
prison and pay the fine of 100,000 lire along with the costs of the proceedings.50 He also 
had to pay the symbolic sum of one lira to De Gasperi in reparation for the damage done 
to his reputation and to publish the sentence twice in Candido.51  The court also added 
eight months of prison time for the suspended sentence of the Einaudi affair. Upon 
hearing the outcome of the trial, several of Guareschi’s detractors, including Eugenio 
Montale, toasted the court’s decision and reveled in Guareschi’s defeat.52   
Guareschi accepted the sentence but not the unfair process in his opinion that lead 
to it. Thus, in an impassioned article, he explained to his readers that he would refuse to 
appeal:  
 No, niente Appello.  
 Qui non si tratta di riformare una sentenza ma un costume. La sentenza è regolare, 
ha il crisma della legalità. Il costume è sbagliato, e non è una questione che riguardi la 
Magistratura: è una questione di carattere generale, che riguarda l’Italia intera. 
 Non è un colpo di testa: io non ho il temperamento dell’aspirante eroe o 
dell’aspirante martire. [. . .]  
 In tutta questa faccenda hanno tenuto conto dell’alibi morale di De Gasperi e non 
si è neppure ammesso che io possegga un alibi morale.  
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 Quarantacinque o quarantasei anni di vita pulita, di lavoro onesto, non sono un 
luminoso alibi morale?  
 Me l’hanno negato. 
 Hanno negato tutta la mia vita, tutto quello che io ho fatto nella mia vita. 
 Non si può accettare un sopruso di questo genere. [. . .] 
 Vado in prigione. Accetto la condanna come accetterei un pugno in faccia: non mi 
interessa dimostrare che m’è stato dato ingiustamente. Il pugno l’ho già preso e nessuno 
potrà far sì che io non l’abbia preso. 
 Non mi pesa la condanna in sé, ma il modo. 
 E il modo ancor m’offende.53  
 
He continued venting his frustration about the ‘tribunale rivoluzionario’ he had just 
faced. Then, he said he would gladly take up his old rucksack and enter prison: ‘Niente di 
teatrale, niente di drammatico. Tutto semplice e naturale. Per rimanere liberi bisogna, a 
un bel momento, prendere senza esitare la via della prigione’.54  
Guareschi spent 409 days in Parma’s San Francesco prison.55 He spent another six 
months on probation, confined to his home in Roncole. When he had finally served all his 
time, he returned as editor of Candido and continued his vigorous political satire. From 
time to time, whenever the question of the authenticity of the letters resurfaced in the 
public sphere, Guareschi would restate his belief that the letters were authentic. He 
believed that the mass media condemned him mistakenly for having published false 
letters, and he did his best to discredit the charge. 
III. Persistent Misinterpretations: 
Misconstrued appraisals of Guareschi’s sentence and refusal to appeal began 
immediately. The day after the trial, as Guareschi reported in Candido, the official 
newspaper of the Christian Democrats, Il Popolo, proclaimed in its broad head: ‘Le 
lettere attribuite a De Gasperi sono false! Un anno di reclusione al diffamatore 
Guareschi’.56  Over the years, journalists and historians have repeated this same claim. 
We have, for example, already seen what the official history of the Democrazia Cristiana 
reports. Other instances include the following taken from various publications:  
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La pubblicazione di alcune lettere, che si rivelarono essere false, in cui si accusava De 
Gasperi di aver invocato durante la Resistenza i bombardamenti angloamericani su 
Roma, fece scattare la denuncia e il processo contro lo stesso scrittore, condannato a un 
anno di carcere [. . .].57  
 
Si tratta di una causa per diffamazione intentata dal leader democristiano contro il 
direttore del «Candido» Giovanni Guareschi, reo di aver diffuso un documento del 1944, 
falso, in cui De Gasperi avrebbe chiesto agli Alleati di bombardare l’acquedotto di Roma 
[. . .]. 58 
 
Guareschi nel ’54 pubblicò sul «Candido» una presunta lettera di De Gasperi che risaliva 
al gennaio del ’44, e con la quale questi avrebbe invitato gli Alleati a bombardare Roma. 
L’aveva comprata da un trafficone, ma si trattava di un falso, come dichiarò il tribunale 
[. . . ].59  
 
L’appunto sulle confidenze di «tale Patrizio» ricorda la vicenda di De Gasperi e delle 
false lettere pubblicate da Guareschi, quando si temeva che lo statista si candidasse al 
Quirinale, dopo la sconfitta del ’55.60  
 
Apart from the mistaken belief that the letters had been declared false, other distortions 
surround Guareschi’s decision not to seek an appeal. 
 Esteemed journalists Indro Montanelli and Enzo Biagi, for example, have both 
stated that, after he had served his time, Guareschi later admitted to them that he had 
made a mistake and wanted to atone for his error by serving out his sentence.61  Giulio 
Andreotti also suggested something similar. Writing in a letter to a lawyer, who in 1996 
attempted to help Guareschi’s children possibly have the sentence officially overturned, 
the senator stated: ‘Uno dei miei collaboratori aveva ottime relazioni con Guareschi  
[. . .] Mi disse dopo aver parlato più volte con Giovannino di avere la certezza che il 
carattere fiero del personaggio lo avesse indotto a subire il carcere, pur essendosi 
convinto di essere stato tratto in inganno’.62 At a later time, Andreotti stated that for him, 
Bonham Carter’s testimony was the decisive piece of evidence that influenced the court: 
‘La presenza come teste del Bonham Carter fu un elemento decisivo per smontare 
l’accusa. [. . .] Guareschi per quel che so era stato tratto in inganno, poi per fierezza non 
volle riconoscerlo’.63  
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To his dying days, however, Guareschi continually hammered home the point that 
he still considered the letters to be authentic. For example, in 1959 a journalist reported 
that Guareschi was the person ‘che sposò la causa dei documenti falsi di Enrico De 
Toma’. Guareschi retorted: ‘Ciò è inesatto: io sposai la causa di due lettere autentiche a 
me affidate — perché ne disponessi gratuitamente come meglio credevo — dal De Toma. 
Non sposai la causa dei “documenti falsi” di Enrico De Toma’.64  A few years earlier, he 
had answered the notion that he wanted to serve jail time in order to expiate his sins and 
undertake penance with these words: ‘Dopo il Referendum, salutando il mio Re che 
partiva per l’esilio, ho dichiarato che, pure non accettandola, mi impegnavo a subire la 
Repubblica così come, più avanti, pur non accettando una condanna da me ritenuta 
ingiusta, ho subito il carcere rifiutando sdegnosamente di appellarmi’.65  
IV. Conclusion: 
Because so many distortions of De Gasperi v. Guareschi have crystallized in the 
collective imagination over the last fifty years, an informed scholarly community 
deserves to know the facts that the official proceedings detail. The Milan tribunal that 
convicted Giovannino Guareschi of libel counted heavily upon the British evidence 
provided by Bonham Carter and Alexander, and it also held De Gasperi’s moral alibi in 
highest regard. Common sense dictated that De Gasperi could never have written those 
letters. For many scholars, the same judgment still holds true today.  De Gasperi’s 
accomplishments alone prove that he was certainly no thug, no common crook. On the 
contrary, in many respects by the time of the trial, he had already laid legitimate claim to 
be a true Italian political hero.  
Indeed, scholars stand on solid ground in surmising that the letters Guareschi 
reproduced were forgeries even if they recognize that the judges, in many aspects, 
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conducted the trial unreasonably. Simply put, Guareschi’s accusation was, and remains, 
too farfetched and scandalous to be plausible. The claim would find an analogy with an 
American journalist who accused Eisenhower of child molestation. The fact that 
Guareschi challenged Italy’s greatest statesman on the grounds he presented indicates a 
disastrous failure of judgment.  
Regardless of the claim, however, it is quite evident that the Court short-changed 
Guareschi and on three accounts did not give him full measure of proof to confute De 
Gasperi’s counter allegation that the letters were forgeries. First, the judges refused to 
hear from six defense witnesses who were ready to bolster Guareschi’s case. Second, 
they never discussed at length why the government had spent so much time seeking to 
recover documents if officials, as De Gasperi explained, had deemed them as bogus. 
Third, the judges did not allow the letters to be submitted for testing.  
Admittedly, the Tribunal did face an almost impossible task — that of trying to 
determine definitively the paternity of a document through scientific analysis, an inexact 
operation that always leaves room for further confutation and debate. But in deciding not 
to undertake that endeavor, the Court capsized Guareschi’s most essential line of defense 
and discarded his own moral alibi. As the proceedings document, Guareschi’s assault 
upon the rectitude of Italy’s most famous statesman seemed to threaten the stability of the 
State itself. 66 In the thick of the Cold War, the Christian Democrat Party, sustained by the 
United States and the Vatican, had become a political juggernaut. It had achieved a status 
that placed its leadership seemingly above reproach. Guareschi could never have gained 
the same admiration the judges held for De Gasperi. 
To counter misreckoning about the case and acquire an accurate understanding of 
how Alcide De Gasperi sent Giovannino Guareschi to jail, we must attentively study the 
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court proceedings and evaluate them with Guareschi’s own commentary upon the events. 
Guareschi opted for imprisonment and did not seek an appeal precisely because he 
recognized the court’s failures laid forth above, not because he wanted to atone for any 
error. Until his untimely death in 1968, he continued to retain that the letters he had 
published were authentic, and even if a determination of their paternity would have been 







Alexander, H. 1954. Letter to Alcide De Gasperi, Giovannino Guareschi Archives. 
Roncole Verdi (PR) 
 
Andreotti, G. 2003. Letter to Author, Giovannino Guareschi Archives. Roncole Verdi 
(PR) 
 
——— 1996. Letter to Carlotta and Alberto Guareschi, Giovannino Guareschi Archives. 
Roncole Verdi (PR) 
 
——— No date. Letter to Ubaldo Giuliani-Balestrino, Giovannino Guareschi Archives. 
Roncole Verdi (PR) 
 
ANSA Press Release. 1954. No title, 20 January 
 
ANSA Press Release, 1954. No title, 21 January 
 
Guareschi, G. 1954. Memoria difensiva, Giovannino Guareschi Archives. Roncole Verdi 
(PR) 
 
Processo Verbale di Dibattimento I, Il Tribunale Penale di Milano. 1954. Giovannino 
Guareschi Archives, Roncole Verdi (PR) 
 
Processo Verbale di Dibattimento II, Il Tribunale Penale di Milano. 1954. Giovannino 
Guareschi Archives, Roncole Verdi (PR). 
 
Processo Verbale di Dibattimento III, Il Tribunale Penale di Milano. 1954. Giovannino 
Guareschi Archives, Roncole Verdi (PR) 
 
Rizzoli, A. 1954. Letter to Guareschi,  Giovannino Guareschi Archives. Roncole Verdi 
(PR) 
 
Secondary Sources:  
 
Andreotti, G. 1986. De Gasperi: Visto da vicino, Milano: Rizzoli 
 
Andriola, F. 1990. Appuntamento sul lago: l’ultimo piano di Benito Mussolini, Milano: 
Sugarco Edizioni 
 
——— 1996. Mussolini-Churchill: Carteggio segreto, Casale Monferrato: PIEMME 
 
Baget-Bozzo, G. 1974. Il partito cristiano al potere, Firenze: Valecchi 
 
Battista, P. 1992. ‘Giovannino fece errore’, La Stampa, 8 February 1992, 23 
 
 25 
Biagi, E. 1984. Mille camere, Milano: Mondadori 
 
Canavaro, A. 1997. Alcide De Gasperi, Milano: Centro Ambrosiano 
 
Chiesa, A. 1990. La satira politica in Italia, Roma-Bari: Laterza 
 
Clark, M. 1996. Modern Italy, 1871-1995, second edition, London and New York: 
Longmans 
 
Danè, C. and G. Allara, eds. 1990. De Gasperi in parliamento 1921-1954, Roma: Cinque 
Lune Edizioni 
 
Del Buono, O. 1995. ‘“De Gasperi Bombardarolo” e Guareschi finì in prigione’, La 
Stampa (Tuttolibri), 21 January, 32 
 
——— 1995. ‘Guareschi diventa candido nell’Italia del dopoguerra’, La Stampa 
(Tuttolibri), 14 January, 36 
 
De Felice, R. 1995. Rosso e nero, Milano: Baldini & Castoldi 
 
De Gasperi, M. R. 1964. De Gasperi, Uomo solo, Milano: Mondadori 
 
——— 1979. Mio caro padre, Brescia: Morcelliana 
 
De Toma, E. 1954. ‘I documenti di Mussolini’, Meridiano d’Italia, Supplemento, 26, 30 
June, 1-39 
 
Di Pietro, A. 1998. ‘Chi fa cortei contro i giudici impari dal grande Guareschi’, Oggi, 29 
July, 7 
 
Durando, G. 1994. ‘Guareschi Innocente’ in . . . Io no!, Turin: Toso, 6074-6078 
 
Franchi, S. 2000. ‘Tango’ e il PCI, Catanzaro: Rubettino Editore 
 
Gianeri, E. and Rauch, A., eds. 1976. Cento anni di satira politica in Italia (1876-1976), 
Florence: Guaraldi Editore 
 
Ginsborg, P.1989. Storia d’Italia dal dopoguerra a oggi, trans, Flores M. and Pierini, S.,  
Torino: Einaudi 
 
Gnocchi, A. 1998. Giovannino Guareschi: Una storia italiana, Milano: Rizzoli 
 
Guareschi, A. and Guareschi, C., eds. 1993. Chi sogna nuovi gerani?, Milano: Rizzoli 
 
Guareschi, Giovannino. 1954a. ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino’, Candido, 4, 24 January, 2, 20-
21 
 
——— 1954b. ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino’, Candido, 9, 28 February,  20-21  
 26 
 
——— 1954c. ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino: Aria greve’, Candido, 7, 14 February, 2-20 
 
——— 1954d. ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino: Il colpo di grazia’, Candido, 5,  31 January, 2, 
20-21  
 
——— 1958. ‘25.000 Trinariciuti bianchi’,  Candido, 24, 15 June, 8 
 
——— 1952a. ‘Il caso Vanoni’, Candido, 6, 10 February, 2 
 
——— 1954e. ‘Il cero’, Candido, 17, 25 April, 10-11 
 
——— ‘Dove sono gli originali delle lettere?’,  Candido, 9, 26 February, 6-7 
 
——— 1952b. ‘Lettera a De Gasperi’,  Candido, 11, 16 March, 1-2 
 
——— 1957.  ‘Lettera al Puerpero’,  Candido, 32, 11 August, 2-7 
 
——— 1954f. ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino: No, niente appello!’,  Candido, 17, 25 April, 16-
23 
 
——— 1959. ‘Rispetta almen le ceneri!’,  Candido, 3, 18 January, 11-12 
 
——— 1949. ‘Ritrattino’,  Candido, 25, 19 June,  4 
 
——— 1951. ‘Se a ciascun l’interno affanno…’,  Candido, 10, 11 March, 1 
 
Innocenti, M. 1997. L’Italia del 1948, Milano: Mursia 
 
Lo Sardo, F. 1993. ‘Lo zampino del santo’, Il Sabato, 23 August, 26-27 
 
Malgeri, F, ed. 1988. ‘De Gasperi e l'età del centrismo 1948-1954’ in Storia della 
Democrazia Cristiana, vol. 2. Roma: Cinque Lune 
 
Mamarella, G. 1993. L’Italia contemporanea, Nuova edizione. Bologna: Il Mulino 
 
Montanelli, Indro. 1998. ‘La stanza di Montanelli’, Corriere della Sera, Milano, 29 
April, 43 
 
Nuzzi, G. 2003. ‘Andreotti, ora è giallo sulla lettera di Violante’,  Il Giornale, 18 
January, 3 
 
Petacco, A. 1985. Dear Benito, caro Winston, Milan: Mondadori 
 
Il Popolo. 1954. ‘Le lettere attribuite a De Gasperi sono false! Un anno di reclusione al 
diffamatore Guareschi’, 16 April, 1  
 
R.C. 2000. ‘Fu giusta la condanna di Guareschi?’, L’Eco di Bergamo, 20 December, 47 
 27 
 
Re, E. 1946. Storia di un archivio: le carte di Mussolini, Milano: Edizioni del Milione 
 
Tompkins, P. 2001. Dalle carte segrete del Duce. Momenti e protagonisti dell’Italia 
fascista nei National Archives di Washington, Milano: Marco Tropea Editore 
 
Tritto, P. 2003. Il destino di Giovannino Guareschi, Matera: Altre Muse Editrice 
 
Zincone, V. 1954. ‘Giovannino va in galera’, Il Resto del Carlino, 6 May, 2 
 













 F. Malgeri, ‘De Gasperi e l'età del centrismo 1948-1954’ in Storia della Democrazia Cristiana, 2 
vols (Rome, Cinque Lune, 1988), II, 218-19.   
2
 G. Guareschi, ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino’, Candido, 4, 24 January 1954, 20-21 (p. 21). 
3
 G. Guareschi, ‘Ritrattino’, Candido, 25, 19 June 1949, p. 4. 
4In one poster, a man stands alone in an election booth ready to vote, the curtains pulled. The 
caption reads: ‘Dio ti vede, Stalin no’. In the other, the skeleton of an Italian prisoner of war left to die in 
Russia, entrapped behind barbed wire, points his bony finger to the Popular Front symbol of Garibaldi 
imposed over a star. The caption read: ‘Mamma, votagli contro anche per me’. For an analysis of their 
importance, see A. Chiesa, La satira politica in Italia, (Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1990), p. 166. 
5
 Ibid p. 166. 
6
 G. Guareschi, ‘Se a ciascun l’interno affanno. . .’, Candido, 10, 11 March 1951, p. 1. In early 
1952, he expressed his concerns in these terms: “Il 18 aprile, la gente aveva sfiducia nei comunisti e fiducia 
in De Gasperi. Oggi la sfiducia nei comunisti è la stessa, se non aumentata. E la fiducia in De Gasperi è, si 
ancora grande; ma la sfiducia negli uomini che lo attorniano aumenta: questo è il guaio. De Gasperi è un 
uomo che cammina con un sacco in spalla: dentro il sacco ci sono le fesserie che commettono i suoi. 
Bisogna stare attenti perché, se il sacco diventa troppo pesante, De Gasperi o mollerà il sacco, o finirà 
assieme a esso per le terre.” See ‘Il caso Vanoni’, Candido, 6, 10 February 1952, p. 2. 
7
 G. Guareschi, ‘Lettera a De Gasperi’, Candido, 11, 16 March 1952, pp. 1-2. 
8
 G. Guareschi, ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino’, Candido, 4, 24 January 1954, (20-21), p. 21. The name 
read as one word and reflected the original way De Gasperi would have spelled it.  
9
 Ibid p. 20. 
10
 Ibid p. 21. 
11
 G. Mamarella, L’Italia contemporanea, (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993), p. 192. See also P. 
Ginsborg, Storia d’Italia del dopoguerra a oggi, translated by M. Flores and S. Pierini, (Turin, Einaudi, 
1989), pp. 245-46. 
12
 O.Del Buono, ‘De Gasperi Bombardarolo e Guareschi finì in prigione’, La Stampa (Tuttolibri), 
21 January 1995, p. 32. 
13
 E. Gianeri and A. Rauch, editors, Cento anni di satira politica in Italia (1876-1976), (Florence, 
Guaraldi Editore, 1976), p. 38.  
14
 ANSA press release, 20 January 1954. 
15
 ANSA press release, 21 January 1954. To counter this charge, Guareschi made it very clear at 
the time of the trial that he had not purchase the letters, stating  that ‘il presunto documento non fu da me 
pagato un sol centesimo, né un sol centesimo mi venne chiesto’. See ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino’, Candido, 4, 
24 January 1954, p. 20.  
16
 G. Guareschi, Chi sogna nuovi gerani, edited by A. and C. Guareschi, (Milan, Rizzoli, 1993), p. 
351. 
17
 G. Guareschi, ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino: Il colpo di grazia’, Candido, 5, 31 January 1954, (2, 20-
21), p. 20. 
18
 Ibid p. 21. Following these comments, Guareschi published a letter written by Angelo Rizzoli, 
the owner of Candido. Rizzoli wanted the general public to understand that he had not known of 
Guareschi’s intentions to accuse De Gasperi, and he ordered Guareschi to reproduce his letter of censure. 
Effectively, Rizzoli sought to distance himself from Guareschi and any legal responsibility. In his letter, 
Angelo Rizzoli stated: ‘Caro Guareschi, con vivo disappunto ho visto riprodotto in Candido un documento 
che un comunicato ANSA dichiara essere apocrifa. Debbo dolermi con Lei di avere proceduto a mia 
insaputa alla pubblicazione di tale documento e, a prescindere dalla veridicità, di non avermi consultato 
sulla opportunità della sua pubblicazione. In tale circostanza, e per la prima volta nella mia vita di editore, 
intendo ben scindere le mie dalla Sue responsabilità. La prego di rendere pubblica attraverso Candido 
questa mia lettera’. (Letter to Guareschi, 23 January 1954). 
 29 
                                                                                                                                                 
19
 As O. Del Buono recounts in ‘Guareschi diventa candido nell’Italia del dopoguerra’: ‘Per 
l’esatezza, all’inizio, non parve troppo serio. Uno scherzo, una leggerezza più che altro [. . .] Comunque 
dato che ormai Giovannino Guareschi aveva quasi più nemici a destra che a sinistra, ci fu un vistoso 
sussulto della suscettibilità parlamentare [. . .].’ The case took place in 1951 when Candido’s assistant 
editor, Carletto Mosca published a cartoon depicting a series of two columns of wine bottles facing each 
other in military formation . Their labels read, ‘Nebiolo — Poderi del Senatore Luigi Einaudi’. The bottles 
served as an honor guard for the small figure of Einaudi that Manzoni had sketched in the background. 
Guareschi published the vignette because he saw an egregious conflict of interest: Einaudi was promoting 
his business interests while using his political clout as President of the Republic. Two members of 
parliament, Giuseppe Bettiol and Paolo Treves, convinced the undersecretary of Justice, Egidio Tosato, to 
authorize proceedings against Guareschi and Manzoni for libel. Both were absolved at first, but upon 
appeal brought by the Procuatore Generale della Repubblica, they were found guilty and given a suspended 
sentence of eight months in jail. See La Stampa (Tuttolibri), 14 January 1995, p. 36. Del Buono provides 
further information about the Nebiolo affair in ‘”De Gasperi bombardarolo” e Guareschi finì in prigione’, 
La Stampa (Tuttolibri), 21 January 1995, p. 32. 
 
20
 E. De Toma, ‘I documenti di Mussolini’, Meridiano d’Italia, Supplemento, 2, 30 June 1954, pp. 
1-39. See also the Processo Verbale I [Court Proceedings], p. 22.   
21
 G. Guareschi, ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino’, 9, 28 February 1954, p. 2, pp. 20-21 
22
 As Guareschi explained: ‘Per comprendere l’importanza morale e giuridica di queste prove, 
basta ricordare che una perizia può decidere le sorti d’un processo e che la presenza della firma di un notaio 
può comportare addirittura l’obbligo legale di ritenere autentico il documento sul quale essa è apposta. Si 
aggiunga poi che una perizia può essere smentita solo da una controperizia riconosciuta dalla Magistratura 
e che la firma di un notaio può essere invalidata solo in base a un’esplicita sentenza del Tribunale, e si 
capirà che a favore delle due lettere esisteva quella che in linguaggio giuridico si chiama «presunzione di 
autenticità». Guareschi, insomma, non aveva solo la certezza di aver fatto tutto il possibile per controllare e 
vagliare i due documenti: aveva il dovere di ritenerli autentici fino a prova contraria ossia fino a quando 
qualcuno avesse dimostrato, con mezzi legalmente validi, che la perizia del prof. Focaccia fosse sbagliata o 
che la firma del notaio svizzero Stamm fosse falsa’. See ‘Dove sono gli originali delle lettere?’, Candido, 9, 
26 February 1956, p. 6.  
23
 Processo Verbale di Dibattimento I, pp. 1-13. All further references are abbreviated to PVD I. 
24
 Ibid p. 14.  
25
 Ibid p. 15. 
26
 Over the span of five years, a series of expert analyses, conducted by the State and on behalf of 
De Toma’s attorneys, finally proved inconclusive. In 1958 a court absolved De Toma for the trafficking of 
false documents and ordered the originals of the letters destroyed. Thus, no way today exists to prove 
definitively that the letters were authentic or forgeries.  
27
 PVD I, pp. 19-20. 
28
 Ibid p. 20-21. Guareschi’s own typed commentary that he read aloud at the trail states: ‘Io 
pubblicai quelle due lettere scritte dal signor De Gasperi con la ragionata certezza della loro autenticità. E 
sulla certezza assoluta della loro autenticità io ho basato il mio commento, commento che il querelante 
definisce diffamatorio, ma che è semplicemente adeguato alla gravità del documento riprodotto sul giornale 
da me diretto e di cui sono responsabile’. See Memoria difensiva, 1954. 
29
 During his interrogation, the court asked Guareschi what specific letters De Toma had shown 
him that were written by De Gasperi. He replied that he had seen only the two in question, and not a third 
to which the letter of 19 January 1944 alludes: ‘Della lettera 12 gennaio ne sono venuto a conoscenza in 
seguito ad una pubblicazione fatta dal Corriere della Sera, ma non l’ho mai vista. See PVD I, p. 23. This is 
an important point because confusion exists over what letters Guareschi actually published. 
30
 PVD I, pp. 25-26.  
31
 Ibid p. 27.  
32
 As historian Mark Clark has observed, even thirty years after the war, government officials had 
laid down laws which forbade citizens from criticizing the values of the Resistance. See Modern Italy, 
1871-1995, second edition, (London and New York, Longmans, 1996), p. 316.  
33
 PVD I, p. 29.  
34
 H. Alexander, typewritten letter to ‘Signor De Gasperi’, 23 February 1954.  
35
 Processo Verbale di Dibattimento II, 14 April 1954, p. 4. All further references are abbreviated 
to PVD II. 
 30 
                                                                                                                                                 
36
 Ibid, p. 5. Interestingly, in the weeks leading up to the proceedings, Guareschi had pondered in 
Candido why such agents, even if acting on their own initiative, had sought documents that De Gasperi had 
always claimed to be false. See ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino: Aria greve’, Candido, 7, 14 February 1954, pp. 2, 
20. 
37
 Ibid pp. 6-8. 
38
 Ibid p. 10. 
39
 Ibid p. 12. 
40
 Ibid p. 15.  
41
 G. Zucconi, ‘Guareschi inchiodato alle sue responsabilità’, Il Popolo, 15 April 1954, p. 2.  
42
 G. Guareschi, ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino: No, niente appello!’, Candido, 17, 25 April 1954, (16-
23) p. 22.  
 
43
 Important works on the life of Alcide De Gasperi and his leadership of Italy during the 
reconstruction and early economic recovery years include: G. Baget-Bozzo, Il partito cristiano al potere, 
(Florence, Valecchi, 1974); C. Danè and G. Allara, editors, De Gasperi in parliamento 1921-1954 (Rome, 
Cinque Lune, 1990); A. Canavaro, Alcide De Gasperi (Milan, Centro Ambrosiano, 1997); M. Innocenti, 
L’Italia del 1948 (Milan, Mursia, 1997); and G. Andreotti, De Gasperi: Visto da vicino (Milan, Rizzoli, 
1986). For a more intimate and familial portrait, see M. Romana De Gasperi’s two works, De Gasperi, 
Uomo solo (Milan, Mondadori, 1964) and Mio caro padre (Brescia, Morcelliana, 1979). 
44
 PVD II, pp. 18-19. 
45
 G. Guareschi, ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino: No, niente appello!’, p. 22. In 1998, Judge Antonio Di 
Pietro, who had been the primary investigator of the Mani Pulite [Clean Hands] inquiry that came to topple 
Italy’s corrupt political system in the early 1990s, reflected on Guareschi’s decision and commented that, 
more than a great Italian writer and father of Don Camillo and Peppone, Guareschi should be remembered 
because ‘è stato soprattutto un esempio di rettitudine morale, indipendentemente dall’ideologia di 
appartenenza. [. . .] De Gasperi lo querelò. Ne scaturì un processo in cui, però, nonostante le formali 
assicurazioni, non fu ammessa la perizia grafica sulle lettere in possesso di Guareschi. Esse vennero 
considerate false sulla base della parola di De Gasperi. [. . .] Guareschi fu condannato a un anno di 
reclusione. Per protesta verso una decisione che considerava ingiusta non scese in piazza a manifestare 
contro i magistrati, come qualcun altro ama fare ora, ma addirittura rinunciò a proporre appello e si avviò in 
carcere pur di rimanere coerente con se stesso’. See ‘Chi fa cortei contro i giudici impari dal grande 
Guareschi’, Oggi 28 July 1998, p. 42. 
46
 Processo Verbale di Dibattimento III, 15 April 1954, pp. 42-43. All further references are 
abbreviated to PVD III. 
47
 Ibid pp. 38-42.  
48
 G. Guareschi, ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino: No, niente appello!’, p. 23. 
49
 Ibid p. 22. 
50
 The estimated value of the fine today would be worth around 4,000 Euro or approximately 6,000 
US dollars. 
51
 PVD III, p. 51.  
52
 A. Gnocchi, Giovannino Guareschi: Una storia italiana, (Milano, Rizzoli, 1998), p. 238.  
53
 G. Guareschi, ‘No, niente appello!’, p. 16.  
54
 Ibid p. 16.  Guareschi crafted a Don Camillo tale, ‘Il cero’ to vent his frustration. Alcibiade, a 
landowner, sues his renter Bazzigà for having fabricated a letter with Aliciabe’s signature that invalidated 
his contract. Alcibiade had in reality signed the letter but later thought it best not to get out of the contract. 
The court decides in favor of Alcibiade who then triumphantly returns to town and brings a candle to Don 
Camillo, inviting him to light it on the altar in front of the Madonna. Don Camillo lights the candle. It 
flickers and then goes out. He whittles the wax and tries once more, but again the light falters.  He brings 
the candle to the rectory, lights it, and sure enough, the candle burns brightly. As soon as he brings it to the 
altar in front of the Blessed Mother, the candlelight continues no more. Don Camillo begins to think that 
something diabolical is at work. He takes the candle, leaves the chapel and walks along the bank of a canal. 
Just as he stops to toss the candle in the water, it squirts from his hand and slithers away into the darkness: 
‘” Meno male che non mi ha morsicato” sussurra don Camillo che ormai non capisce più niente’. See 
Candido, 17, 25 April 1954, pp. 10-11.  
 31 
                                                                                                                                                 
55
 According to V. Zincone, at the time Guareschi entered prison, he became the only Italian 
journalist since the founding of the nation to have ever served actual jail time for libel. See ‘Giovannino va 
in galera’, Il Resto del Carlino, 6 May 1954, p. 2. 
56Il Popolo, ‘Le lettere attribuite a De Gasperi sono false! Un anno di reclusione al diffamatore 
Guareschi’, p. 1.   
57
 S. Franchi, ‘Tango’ e il PCI, (Catanzaro, Rubettino Editore, 2000), p. 33.   
58
 P. Battista, ‘Giovannino fece errore’, La Stampa, 8 February 1992, p. 29. 
59
 R.C., ‘Fu giusta la condanna di Guareschi?’, L’Eco di Bergamo, 20 December 2000, p. 47. 
60
 G. Nuzzi, ‘Andreotti, ora è giallo sulla lettera di Violante’, Il Giornale, 18 January 2003, p. 3. 
61
 I. Montanelli, ‘La stanza di Montanelli’, Corriere della Sera, 29 April 1998, p. 43.  See also E. 
Biagi, Mille camere, (Milan, Mondadori, 1984), p. 31.  
62
 G. Andreotti, Letter to Ubaldo Giuliani-Balestrino, No date, p. 7.  
63
 G. Andreotti, Letter to Author, 2 July 2003, No page.  
64
 G. Guareschi, ‘Rispetta almen le ceneri!’, Candido, 3, 18 January 1959, p. 12.   
65
 G. Guareschi, ’25,000 trinariciuti bianchi’, Candido, 24, 15 June 1958, p. 8. A year before he 
had stated: ‘quella stampa governativa [. . .] si arrabattò per cambiare le carte in tavola presentando una 
condanna per diffamazione a mezzo stampa come una condanna per pubblicazione di documento falso.  
[. . . ] le lettere ispiratrici di quel commento che mi fruttò ospitalità al San Francesco esistevano, erano 
autentiche e ne possedevo io stesso gli originali’. See ‘Lettera al puerpero’, Candido, 32, 11 August 1957, 
p.  2. 
66Andreotti, in a letter to Carlotta and Alberto Guareschi dated 8 May 1996, predictably sustained 
that the tribunal was not swayed by the political climate of the times: ‘non credo che il clima politico del 
1954 fosse tale da negar giustizia ad un giornalista notissimo di cui era stata esemplare la fierezza nel 
campo di prigionia’. One of De Gasperi’s close friends, however, admits that the political climate did have 
a role. In 1993 Flaminio Piccoli in said: ‘Che il clima politico di quegli anni aver influito sui giudici non lo 
nego. L’impressione era che si volesse infangare una pagina di storia. Se poi i giudici si siano fatti 
influenzare troppo da quel clima, lo sanno loro ed è cosa che riguarda la loro coscienza’. See F. Lo Sardo, 
‘Lo zampino del santo’, Il Sabato, 23 August 1993, 26-27 (p.27). For further consideration of political 
ramifications surrounding the trial, I recommend P. Tritto,  Il destino di Giovannino Guareschi (Matera, 
Altre Muse Editrice,2003). 
